| We make statements about classes of objects in at least two
distinct ways. Sometimes our statement is intended to say something about
the members of the class considered separately, as individuals; other times
our statement is intended to say something about the class itself, or the
members of the class considered together. For example:
(a) Cows eat grass.
(b) Cows are important to the
economy of Wisconsin.
In sentence (a) the meaning of the sentence is distributed to the
members of the class. Each cow, considered as an individual, eats grass. In
sentence (b) the meaning of the sentence is not distributed. While it is
true that cows (as a group) are important to Wisconsin's economy, any
particular cow might die without causing the economy of Wisconsin to go into
a slump. The meaning of the sentence has collective value.
Of course, if we were to offer an argument in which the two senses
occurred together, the result would be fallacious:
Cows are important to the economy of Wisconsin.
Bossie is a cow.
Therefore, Bossie is important to the economy of Wisconsin.
We cannot identify either the major premiss or the minor premiss as
false. Rather, the error occurs because of a shift from collective meaning
(in the major premiss) to the distributive meaning (in the minor premiss,
and from there to the conclusion). Hence the fallacy has the characteristic
earmarks of a Fallacy of Ambiguity. Distributive fallacy can also shift in
the opposite direction:
Rocky Road ice cream, ketchup and potato chips are foods that I like.
A Rocky Road-ketchup-potato chip sundae is composed of Rocky Road ice cream,
ketchup and potato chips.
Therefore, a Rocky Road-ketchup-potato chip sundae is a food that I like.
Again, both premisses are true. However, in this case, the major premiss
has distributive meaning while the minor premiss and the conclusion have
collective meaning.
There is no guarantee that qualities manifested in the parts
will be manifested in the whole, or that the qualities manifested in the
whole will be manifested in the parts. However, there are some interesting examples
in which the inference from parts to whole or whole to parts is perfectly sound. For
example, "The legs of this desk are made of wood. So is the writing
surface, the back, the shelves, and the sides. This is a wooden
desk." Or, "The company recommends comprehensive auto insurance.
Comprehensive auto insurance includes collision insurance, liability
insurance and emergency towing. Therefore the company recommends that you
have each of these kinds of insurance."
What should we make of these examples? I think the lesson to be learned
is that the move from parts to whole or whole to parts alone is not what makes
the Distributive Fallacy fallacious. Rather it is the move from parts to
whole or whole to parts in a context in which we are discussing an "emergent"
property, i.e. a property that is true of the whole because of some sort
of collective interaction among the parts. Non-emergent properties are
common enough that arguments moving from parts to whole or whole to parts can often be used soundly and
effectively. Unfortunately, since the distinction between emergent and
non-emergent properties is easy to overlook (and is perhaps hard to
understand), it is possible for the Distributive Fallacy to be
passed off as non-fallacious. |