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The fallacy of Equivocation mimics good reasoning in a
fairly obvious way: assuming that the shift in the meaning of words could be
overlooked, the argument would be good reasoning, having apparently
true premisses and an apparently valid form. Moreover, much of the power and
beauty of language is contained in its ability to express multiple meanings,
and subtle shades of meaning, with a single well-turned phrase; so, we
sometimes overlook or forgive shifts in meaning. A successful fallacy of
Equivocation disguises its logical flaw behind the fact that a single word
can be used to express more than one idea. Otherwise, an Equivocation looks
just like a standard piece of good reasoning. Perhaps because the fallacy
of Equivocation does not have a distinctive form or leading principle of its
own, it can occur in reasoning of any type. In the exercises on this website
I have primarily focused on Equivocation as it might occur in Deductive
arguments, but Equivocation might also occur in Inductive and Retroductive
arguments as well. Indeed, I believe there are some specifically Inductive
and Retroductive versions of Equivocation that are worth watching out for.
INDUCTIVE:
Inappropriate operational definitions - In making observations on a sample,
it is sometimes necessary to specify precisely which property or behavior we
are trying to observe. Are children more active than adults? To settle this
question we need to observe some children and adults. But what precisely
should we be watching for? We need to know which behaviors count as "being
active." Running and jumping, for example, may be suitably observable. In
specifying precisely what we intend to observe we create what is called an
"operational definition." It is in the nature of operational definitions to
be more limited and behavioristic than the concepts they are intended to
capture. Within reason, this is perfectly acceptable, and unavoidable in any
case. However, sometimes the difference between the original concept and the
operational definition becomes so great that we are not in fact observing
what we claim to be observing. The most notorious example is the operational
definition of "intelligence" as "scores well on a Stanford-Benet I.Q. test."
It is known that success on the Stanford-Benet I.Q. test is heavily
influenced by familiarity with the culture of white, middle-class America.
People unfamiliar with that culture tend to score poorly on the test, even
if they are very "intelligent" by a more usual understanding of the word.
RETRODUCTIVE:
"Why" questions - Explanations are more slippery than they appear. There are
usually several ways to answer a question of the form "Why did that happen?"
Why, for example, did World War I start? In some contexts it is enough to
answer that question by saying that the Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated.
But why did the assassination of the Archduke start the war? Well, it was
the assassination of the Archduke that set off an ethnic conflict in which
the nations of Europe became entangled because of a baroque network of
mutual alliances that were in force because... and the whole thing begins to
sound like "this is the house that Jack built." At what point have we given
an adequate explanation? It is hard to say. Even the explanation for a much
simpler event can be rife with ambiguities. Why did Socrates sit down? One
way to answer that question is by saying, "Because he relaxed the muscles of
his legs, causing his knees to bend." Another way to answer it is by saying,
"Because he was tired." Both answers may be true, but probably only one will
satisfy the question in the context in which it was asked. Answering the
wrong question may give the false impression that an adequate explanation
was given when in fact it was not. |