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It is a well-known fact that we tend to feel sympathy
for others when we can imagine ourselves in their place. Hence we tend
to empathize most strongly with beings that are most like ourselves.
Anyone is likely to be disturbed by the suffering of a chimpanzee. We
are less disturbed by the suffering of a rabbit, and the suffering of a
fish bothers us practically not at all. Even if we agree that a rabbit
and a fish can feel just as much pain as a chimpanzee, we still find
their pain less important and less disturbing. It may be callous and
immature of us to assume that being "like me" is an important moral
consideration, but...well, instincts are not necessarily rational.
Given this principle of empathy, it is reasonable to suppose that people
who are (or consider themselves) different from me may not fully
empathize with my suffering. The fallacy of Special Pleading mimics
reasoning based on this perfectly reasonable psychological expectation.
However, while it may be perfectly valid to say, "You aren't like me, so
you may not fully empathize with my plight," it is quite a different
thing to say, "You aren't like me, so your arguments (about my plight)
are utterly worthless." The fallacy of Special Pleading depends upon our
failing to see this distinction. I may not fully empathize with rabbit
suffering, but I can still reason clearly about what might cause a
rabbit to suffer and about how that suffering might be reduced. My
opponent may not fully empathize with my plight, but his arguments still
deserve to be considered on their own merits, not judged by his ability
(or lack of ability) to empathize with me.
All such considerations aside, it should also be pointed out that, in
fact, all human beings are very much alike. The fallacy of Special
Pleading presupposes that some differences are so great that the human
capacity for empathy cannot cross them. Our ability to empathize with
others is usually greater than this argument gives us credit for. |